For months, social media profiles sharing idyllic Scottish landscapes and supporting independence from the United Kingdom appeared to belong to genuine locals. In reality, they were part of a covert influence operation run by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to researchers at Clemson University's Media Forensics Hub in South Carolina.
The network operated across X, Instagram, and Bluesky, carefully cultivating followers by engaging in local political conversations—criticising the UK Labour Party, the monarchy, and Prime Minister Keir Starmer, while championing Scottish independence. Once they had built credibility, the accounts pivoted sharply after the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran in late February, shifting to pro-Iranian propaganda.
“After the war started, they completely pivoted to posting pro-Iran footage of Iranian strikes on enemies of Iran, such as Israel and other places such as Saudi Arabia,” said Ella Murray, digital influence analyst at the Clemson University Media Forensics Hub. The accounts used identical footage and hashtags, making the coordinated nature of the operation easier to identify.
The content included glorification of the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, AI-generated images purporting to show destroyed US military bases, and posts criticising US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Some profiles presented themselves as women, using stolen or AI-generated images. In one case, a British-sounding account accidentally inserted a Farsi character at the start of a hashtag, revealing the operator was switching between Persian and English keyboards.
Two Subsets of Fake Profiles
Researchers identified two distinct groups of English-language accounts: one claiming to be from Scotland and England, and another from Ireland and Northern Ireland. Before the conflict escalated, these accounts had spent years building followings by posting anti-union, anti-Labour, and anti-Royal Family content. “There were real Scottish and Irish people interacting with these accounts,” Murray noted, adding that the profiles had blended into genuine local political debates before switching to pro-Iranian messaging.
The operation was not limited to the British Isles. A parallel network posted in Spanish, pretending to be from Texas, California, Venezuela, and Chile, presenting themselves as progressive activists or supporters of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. They jumped on viral events such as protests in Minneapolis following the shooting of Renée Good by an ICE officer, posting messages like “The police brutality in Minneapolis is just the tip of the iceberg of institutional racism that affects us all.”
Europol, the EU's law enforcement agency, announced in May that it had shut down thousands of IRGC-affiliated accounts across 19 countries between February and April. The crackdown followed the IRGC's formal designation as a terrorist organisation on 19 February, which gave authorities legal grounds to target its online infrastructure. Europol also took down the IRGC's main X account, which had amassed over 150,000 followers. According to Europol, the posts blended religious martyrdom with pro-Iranian political messages, used AI-generated videos to glorify the IRGC, and called on users to avenge the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The revelations come amid broader scrutiny of Iran's online influence campaigns, which range from repurposed old war footage to AI-generated content and viral Lego video clips reportedly produced by Iranian teams. The operation highlights the growing sophistication of foreign interference in European public discourse, particularly through the exploitation of local political grievances. As the EU and its member states strengthen their digital defences, the case underscores the need for vigilance against networks that seek to manipulate public opinion by impersonating citizens of member states.
