Russia's attempt to build a homegrown satellite internet network, designed to guide its drones and missiles against Ukraine, has hit another setback. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), none of the 16 satellites launched on 19 July as part of the Rassvet programme reached their intended orbit. Data from the live satellite tracker N2YO shows most are now circling at altitudes of 300 to 400 kilometres, far below the planned 870-kilometre operational altitude.
At least two of the satellites appear to be on a trajectory that will bring them back into Earth's atmosphere. Those flying at lower altitudes face greater atmospheric drag, which burns fuel faster and shortens their operational lifespan. Even if they stabilise, they are unlikely to last as long as Moscow had hoped.
Satellite internet has become a cornerstone of modern warfare in Ukraine. Kyiv's access to Starlink has allowed its forces to operate reconnaissance and strike drones, coordinate artillery fire, and maintain communications in areas where Russian strikes have destroyed ground infrastructure. The stakes are far from abstract: since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) has verified at least 16,874 civilian deaths and 51,173 injuries as of the end of July.
In a report published on 13 August, HRMMU noted that July 2026 was the deadliest month for Ukrainian civilians since March 2022, with at least 437 killed and 2,610 injured. The spike was driven by a sharp rise in aerial bombardment and glide bomb attacks, alongside continued long-range missile and drone strikes on cities far from the front line. The mission's monthly reports also recorded successive records for short-range drone casualties near the front in April and May.
A troubled launch record
The Rassvet programme has struggled from the start. Of the 16 satellites launched on 24 March, only 12 reached their intended altitude of 550 kilometres and remain there, according to the ISW report. Those satellites already provide Russian forces with two daily windows of connectivity with ground terminals, lasting up to 90 minutes in total over Ukraine.
Moscow appears to be rushing the programme to compensate for the loss of Starlink access. Ukraine's defence ministry said in early February that Starlink terminals being used illicitly by Russian forces had been deactivated after Kyiv and SpaceX moved to a "whitelist" system restricting the network to verified terminals. The ISW report noted that "Russia may have been unprepared to accelerate constellation deployment at this pace and will likely face additional delays."
But the threat has not disappeared. ISW warned that the existing satellites "may allow Russian forces to conduct more precise strikes against Ukraine using remotely controlled unmanned systems" during the windows when connectivity works. This is a reminder that Russia does not need a fully functioning constellation to keep inflicting harm — only a partially working one.
Falling short of scale
Bureau 1440, the Russian aerospace firm developing the satellites, has said it plans "dozens" more launches to deploy hundreds of additional satellites. However, Serhii Beskrestnov, then an adviser to Ukraine's defence minister, said on 31 May that Russia would need at least 200 to 250 satellites in orbit to achieve continuous, stable connectivity, and that Moscow was unlikely to reach that target in the near term.
The report attributes Russia's bottleneck to its reliance on the Soyuz-2.1b rocket, described as "a costly and scarce asset." Since 2022, Russia has conducted only six to eight Soyuz-2.1b launches across all space and commercial missions. That tempo would allow for "a maximum of 128 Rassvet satellites per four years," and only if every launch succeeded and none were diverted elsewhere. So far, only 37.5% of launched Rassvet satellites have reached a sustainable operational altitude.
Ukraine targets the supply chain
Ukrainian forces have also gone after the infrastructure behind the programme, in an apparent effort to slow a system that would extend Russia's ability to deliver deadly strikes. On the night of 14–15 August, Ukrainian forces struck the Progress Space Rocket Center, which produces Soyuz-type launch vehicles. A further strike was attempted against the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on 23 August, two days before Russia launched a Soyuz-2.1b vehicle reportedly carrying a GLONASS-K1 satellite, part of Russia's GPS alternative.
Both Rassvet batches were launched from Plesetsk. The ISW report concluded that Ukrainian strikes "threaten not only Russia's limited supply and production of launch vehicles but also the scarce launch infrastructure to place satellites into orbit" — infrastructure that, if it succeeds, will make Russia's war on Ukraine much more lethal.
As European leaders weigh their response to Russian hybrid threats, the fate of Rassvet is a reminder that Moscow's military ambitions extend beyond the battlefield. The EU has already pledged support for Ukraine, including a €90 billion loan to help sustain the country's defence. Meanwhile, EU defence experts are examining how to close capability gaps as the threat from Russia evolves. The failure of Rassvet may be a technical story, but its implications are deeply political — and deeply European.
