The number of Russian citizens legally residing in the European Union has grown by roughly 105,000 since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, according to an analysis of Eurostat data. By the end of 2025, 876,600 Russian nationals held valid temporary or permanent residence permits across the bloc, up from 771,800 in 2021 – a rise of 13.6%.
Germany continues to host the largest Russian community, with 218,000 residents, followed by Spain (116,800) and Estonia (78,400). But the most dramatic increases have occurred in southern Europe. Spain issued residence permits to 44,400 Russian nationals over the period, while France granted 13,700. Cyprus and Portugal saw their Russian-born populations multiply by 2.5 and 3.5 times respectively.
Not all member states have moved in the same direction. Latvia, Estonia and the Czech Republic have recorded the largest drops in Russian residents, reflecting stricter migration policies and, in the Baltic states, heightened security concerns over large Russian-speaking minorities. These countries have also been vocal in pushing for a harder line on Moscow, as seen in recent debates over Arctic security and Russian activity.
Beyond the EU: a wider exodus
Significant Russian communities have also formed outside the bloc. In Serbia, the Russian population surged from roughly 5,000 before the invasion to 61,900 by the end of 2025. Kazakhstan had absorbed more than 107,000 Russian migrants by spring, while Armenia and Georgia hosted 43,500 and 70,000 respectively. Turkey initially drew large numbers but later tightened residency rules; by June, valid Russian permits there had fallen to 75,900, half the 2023 peak.
Researchers tracking emigration patterns have identified at least four distinct waves since February 2022. The most recent, beginning this spring, has been driven by renewed talk of mobilisation for Moscow's all-out war in Ukraine. As one legal expert put it, many Russians now see no future at home.
“Everyone now understands that they have no future in Russia. There is no image of the future, no understanding of what will happen in six months or a year,” said Anastasia Burakova, a lawyer and founder of Kovcheg, a legal assistance project for Russians abroad. “What is more, there are risks linked to mobilisation and conscription, which people feel very personally.”
Ivan, a 19-year-old who left Russia this spring to avoid conscription, now works in construction in Yerevan and posts videos on YouTube. A year earlier he had managed a mobile phone store. “I thought: this is it, this is life, everything is going the way it should,” he said in a video. “Now I'm sitting on a bench in Yerevan, with no title and no steady job. My wife is next to me. Back then I was a manager and felt trapped. Now I have nothing, and I feel free.”
Profile of the emigrants
Surveys by independent researchers show that the emigrants are predominantly young couples, often without children, with both partners under 36. They tend to be highly educated and concentrated in professions either vulnerable to political repression – journalists, human rights workers, political analysts – or in high international demand, particularly IT, engineering and academia. Around 20% of those who left do not hold university degrees, and some 18% are studying or plan to study abroad.
The emigrants fall into three broad groups: those who have settled and expect to remain abroad long-term, those who have already moved once and are preparing to relocate again, and those still in Russia who intend to leave within six months.
Economic impact on host countries
The economic effects have been visible yet uneven. In Armenia and Georgia, the sudden influx of people and capital contributed to GDP growth of between 9% and 9.4% at its peak between 2022 and 2024, according to analysis by the CASE Center research institute. Average Russian household incomes in Serbia ran to around €3,500 per month against a local average of €900; in Georgia the figures were €3,300 against €650. The effect has since moderated as host economies adapted, with growth settling back to 5–7% annually.
Rather than competing for local jobs, most Russian migrants have worked remotely or set up their own businesses. In IT, up to 41% have maintained income from foreign clients, while in the media sector around 21% have done so, channelling money into host economies through taxes and everyday spending.
Returns remain limited
Russian authorities and independent researchers have documented some returns, but the scale remains disputed. The independent OutRush sociological project estimated that no more than 8% of emigrants had returned to Russia by summer 2024, with around 5% more intending to do so. The Institute of Applied Economic Research at RANEPA, a state-linked academic institution, put the overall return rate from the 2022–2023 wave at roughly 10%. Estimates from consulting firms and recruitment agencies are considerably higher, ranging from 16% among IT workers to 40–45% of those who left at the peak. Commonly cited reasons for returning include difficulty finding work, legal status problems and the closure of relocated Russian businesses.
The ongoing exodus has implications for the EU's broader relationship with Moscow, particularly as member states debate how to fund Ukraine's defence and how quickly to end Russian energy imports. For now, the trend shows no sign of reversing.
