The collision between a Renfe AVE and an Iryo train near Urda in Toledo province on Wednesday has left at least 69 people dead and more than 100 injured. The crash occurred at 8:53 am at kilometre 118 of the Madrid–Seville high-speed line, when the AVE ploughed into the rear of the Iryo train, which was stationary on the same track. It is Spain's second major high-speed rail disaster in less than a year, following the Adamuz (Córdoba) crash in January 2026 that claimed 46 lives.
While the definitive cause has not been established, investigators are focusing on a failure in the signalling system and, in particular, on the order issued from Adif's control centre at Madrid's Atocha station for the AVE to resume its journey. The sequence of events in the 17 minutes before impact is now under intense scrutiny.
Signalling failure and the order to proceed
The first incident was recorded at around 8:30 am, when an IT failure disrupted communications and caused the LZB safety system to fail along a roughly 63-kilometre section of the line. The LZB system transmits information between infrastructure and trains to monitor traffic and maintain safe distances. It has been in operation since the line opened in the 1990s and is due to be replaced by the more modern European ERTMS system.
The failure affected six trains, forcing them to stop or reduce speed. Among them were Iryo 6076, carrying 147 passengers including a baby, and Renfe's AVE 2080, with 397 passengers on board. However, the IT failure alone does not explain the accident. When the main signalling system fails, alternative procedures are in place to manage train movements. Investigators are working to establish why those safeguards failed to prevent two trains from occupying the same section of track.
According to a reconstruction published by the Ministry of Transport and communication recordings published by El País, at 8:36 am an Adif controller authorised the AVE driver to resume his journey under the lineside signalling block (BSL) system. The instruction allowed the train to continue under "normal running" conditions, even though the main signalling system had failed. The driver requested confirmation of the order, which the controller subsequently confirmed.
The distinction is crucial: under "driving on sight" rules, drivers must adjust their speed to ensure they can stop before reaching any obstacle, with a speed limit of 40 kilometres per hour. By contrast, permission to resume normal running meant the AVE could travel at a significantly higher speed. Transport Minister Óscar Puente described the control centre's decision as "inexplicable" and argued that the train should never have resumed its journey under those conditions.
The 17 minutes before the collision
The reconstruction of communications provides a timeline that will be central to the investigation:
- 8:30 am – A computer fault disables the LZB system, forcing several trains to stop.
- 8:36 am – Adif's control centre in Atocha authorises AVE 2080 to resume its journey under BSL and continue running normally.
- 8:41 am – The Iryo driver informs the control centre that her train remains stopped on the approach to Urda due to a loss of transmission. The controller also authorises her to resume her journey.
- 8:48 am – The Iryo driver contacts Atocha again, reporting that she is unable to restart the LZB system and that her train remains stationary. According to the recordings, the AVE is not instructed to stop.
- 8:53 am – The AVE collides with the rear of the Iryo train, after travelling roughly 25 kilometres since receiving authorisation to continue.
The recordings raise a fundamental question: why was the AVE not ordered to slow down or stop after the control centre received the warnings from the Iryo driver? The communications, traffic logs and black box data from both trains will be crucial in reconstructing the decisions made during those 17 minutes.
Could the accident have been avoided?
This is one of the key questions that the judicial and technical investigations will need to address. The government has initially suggested possible human error at Adif's control centre, but responsibility has not yet been determined. Investigators will need to establish whether operating protocols were correctly followed, what information was available to staff at Atocha, and why the authorisation given to the AVE was not revised after confirmation that the Iryo train remained stationary.
They will also examine whether there were additional failures in the systems responsible for monitoring and ensuring rail safety. The cause of the accident has therefore not yet been established, and responsibility cannot be attributed to any single individual until the investigations are complete.
The Court of First Instance and Preliminary Investigation No. 2 in Orgaz (Toledo) has taken over the judicial investigation, which remains confidential. Among the first measures ordered by the court is a restriction on access to a two-kilometre section of the high-speed line around the crash site. The court has also prohibited the removal of materials and debris from the affected area without prior authorisation and ordered the seizure and preservation of the trains' black boxes.
As Spain mourns its second high-speed rail disaster in nine months, the focus now turns to the decisions made in the control centre and the safety protocols that failed. The scrutiny on Madrid's control centre is intensifying, and the political fallout is already being felt, with Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez vowing a tough response if safety failures are confirmed. The investigation will determine whether this tragedy could have been prevented.
