At the Hannover Messe this spring, the mood among Europe's industrial leaders was tense. Siemens CEO Roland Busch told Bloomberg that the company's investment logic now points away from the European Union. “It’s nonsense to treat industrial and machine data the same way as personal data,” Busch said. “I can’t explain to my shareholders why I’m investing money in an environment where I’m being held back.”
His words cut to the heart of a dilemma facing the continent: can Europe retain its industrial champions in the age of artificial intelligence, or will regulation and global competition drive them to the United States and China?
The Trump Effect and the Lure of American Shores
The threat is not theoretical. US President Donald Trump told the World Economic Forum in 2025 that “there will be no better place on Earth to create jobs, build factories, or grow a company than right here in the good old USA.” His administration has combined deregulation, tax cuts for domestic manufacturers via the so-called “One big beautiful bill,” and a steady drumbeat of tariff threats. The result: a list of 15 EU companies that have announced new investments in the US, including Siemens Healthineers ($150 million to relocate production from Mexico to California), Siemens ($285 million for manufacturing and AI data centers, creating 900 jobs), and Siemens Energy ($1 billion for grid and gas turbine equipment).
Whether these investments are genuinely new or simply repackaged existing plans for political effect is unclear. What is clear is that the gravitational pull of the American market—combined with regulatory friction at home—is reshaping corporate strategies across Europe.
Data Rules: The Core of the Conflict
At the heart of Busch's complaint is the EU's approach to data regulation. The bloc treats industrial and machine data with the same strictness as personal data, a framework that large manufacturers argue stifles innovation. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has voiced support for simplifying AI rules for industry, but translating that rhetoric into legislative change is proving difficult.
The upcoming Data Act, part of the European Data Union Strategy, aims to merge the Open Data Directive and the Data Governance Act while repealing the Free Flow of Non-Personal Data Regulation. Industry lobbyists are pushing back, arguing that obligations to share data with smaller players threaten trade secrets. The European Commission itself acknowledged in its Data Union Strategy communication that “individual manufacturers are hesitant to share this data due to trade secrets, privacy, and competition concerns.”
This tension is not just about big versus small. It reflects a deeper political friction: some politicians and lobby groups dismiss calls for simplification as “US lobbying,” ignoring the fact that the loudest critics are European companies themselves. The result is a stalemate that risks driving investment elsewhere.
AI Gigafactories: Sovereignty vs. Speed
The EU's AI Continent Action Plan envisions five AI Gigafactories—massive computing facilities designed to support European industry's AI development. Each gigafactory will need at least 100,000 chips, and most of those currently come from the US. The bloc's rapid response to the Biden AI Diffusion Plan in early 2025, when Commission officials asked Washington to rethink its export controls, underscored Europe's dependence on American semiconductors.
The European Chips Act, launched in 2022, aimed to double Europe's global semiconductor market share to 20% by 2030. The Chips IPCEIs began rolling out in 2023, and global demand—projected to grow by roughly 25%—is pulling the European industry upward, with estimated double-digit growth in 2026. But the rise of AI has exposed a gap: Europe needs AI-optimized chips now, not in five years. The EU is now initiating Chips Act 2.0, with industry estimates suggesting a need for €30–60 billion in EU funding, supplemented by €50–60 billion from member states, for a total including private investment of €200–300 billion.
In early 2026, a group of countries from France to Poland asked the Commission for more details on the conditions for AI Gigafactories before launching the call. France, according to Euractiv, is unhappy about the prospect of European taxpayer money flowing into American chips without sufficiently exploring European alternatives. German ministries have grown quieter on the issue, reflecting the broader uncertainty.
The choice Europe faces is stark: prioritize speed by buying American chips and risk losing sovereignty, or prioritize sovereignty by investing in domestic production and risk falling behind. Either way, the continent's industrial champions are watching closely—and voting with their balance sheets.
