Across the continent, leaders are increasingly voicing alarm over a new, more dangerous phase in Russia's hybrid warfare against NATO members. At a meeting of EU foreign ministers in early September, the bloc's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, framed President Vladimir Putin's objective as an attempt to “scare us away from supporting Ukraine.” She insisted that “he will not succeed.”
Yet behind the public defiance, European diplomats and security experts acknowledge a troubling gap: the alliance has yet to deliver a response that would make Moscow think twice. As one diplomat put it, the absence of a powerful deterrent is leaving the continent exposed to ever bolder provocations.
Germany's rare direct accusation
In August, German authorities formally blamed the Kremlin for planting an explosive-laden drone at Leipzig Airport. The device failed to detonate, but the incident marked Berlin's most direct confrontation with Moscow in years. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt stated that “police investigations, patterns of the offences and intelligence findings establish Russian responsibility for the attempted attack.” In response, Germany shut the Russian consulate in Bonn and terminated an agreement that had allowed the Russian House cultural centre in Berlin to remain open despite long-standing suspicions of espionage.
Days later, a plane carrying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy narrowly avoided a Russian drone as he departed for the funeral of King Harald in Oslo on 7 September. The incident underscored how close to NATO leaders these attacks have come.
“The Kremlin has the measure of us”
Ed Arnold, a senior adviser at the British Foreign Policy Group, questions why such incidents do not meet the threshold for a NATO response. “By doing nothing, we are chipping away at the deterrence value of NATO,” he said. He noted that the Leipzig drone, had it detonated, could have been lethal. “The incident wasn't foiled by security services; the explosives didn't go off,” he added. “NATO needs to have a comprehensive response now, because the Kremlin has the measure of us.”
Part of the ambiguity stems from uncertainty over whether Washington would back a collective response. A US intelligence assessment from August suggested Putin might test NATO's resolve with a limited assault on allied territory within a few years, whether through a small-scale incursion or a serious cyber-attack on critical infrastructure. Arnold argues that this uncertainty only fuels Putin's appetite for risk, as he seeks to prove that Article 5 – the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all – is hollow. “He knows that the best bet to achieve this is the current White House administration,” Arnold said. “Putin is a strategist, not a tactician. He still can't beat the Ukrainians in a conventional war, but he can see that the Trump administration is susceptible to Russian charm.”
A charm offensive and a creeping effect
US envoy Steve Witkoff, during talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, lavished praise on Putin: “So first of all President Putin, thank you so much for having us. We were sitting outside just now… and we were all talking about when we retire, we'll have all these incredible stories and incredible memories, and yours will be right at the top of it all.”
Kurt Volker, who served as US ambassador to NATO under the first Trump administration and now advises Ukrainian authorities, told European Pulse that the alliance must be at a much higher state of readiness for an attack that would clearly trigger Article 5. He stressed that the Kremlin must understand there is now “zero tolerance” for its shadow-war activities. Instead, he pointed to drone incursions in Romania and Poland over the past year that have gone unanswered. “We're left questioning – where is the line that if Russia crosses it, we would respond?” he said. “Remember when there were 19 drones in Polish territory and that was shocking, and now we have an armed drone fast circling over Romanian airspace and into Ukraine and nobody says anything. This all has a creeping effect.”
Poland did trigger Article 4 of the NATO charter after the drone incursion last year, a formal consultation that does not commit the alliance to a mutual defence response but signals a threat to territorial integrity. Yet few such consultations have followed, despite escalating Russian activities. Volker warned that invoking Article 4 without a concrete outcome only exposes NATO's “level of disunity.” “If you have Article 4 but then there's no outcome, then maybe it's a better idea not to have the meeting in the first place,” he said.
NATO officials counter that Germany, for instance, did not request an Article 4 consultation after the Leipzig incident. “Germany might do this, but until they do, it's still a matter for the German government to respond and not the alliance,” one official said.
Deterrence in question
Laura Galante, former director of the US Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Centre, is blunt: “The deterrence isn't working. When you have a drone in a civilian airport, we can see this threat in clear focus.” She echoed the view that NATO has yet to find a moment where it draws a firm line.
The Baltic resolve against Russian hybrid threats remains strong, but the broader alliance appears hesitant. As Ukraine's intelligence chief has noted, Europe is finally waking up to the reality of Russia's hybrid war, but recognition alone is not enough. The recent NATO intercept of a Russian submarine exercise near undersea cables shows the alliance is watching, but whether it will act remains the open question.
Without a credible, coordinated response, the Kremlin's calculus may remain unchanged. As Arnold put it, “The Kremlin has the measure of us.”
