The US midterm elections have curbed Donald Trump's domestic power, but that does not mean a weaker president on the world stage. On the contrary, argues US expert Josef Braml: if Congress blocks him at home, Trump is likely to compensate by exerting his authority in foreign, trade, and security policy—areas where presidents traditionally enjoy greater freedom. For Europe, the most difficult two years of his second term may only be beginning.
The midterms were first and foremost a domestic reckoning. Even as votes were still being counted, a clear swing toward the Democrats emerged in both chambers of Congress. For Trump, this was more than a party defeat; the election served as a referendum on his second term, on rising living costs, the consequences of his trade policy, and not least the Iran war. But anyone concluding that Trump will now be politically paralysed could be mistaken. His weakening at home may actually increase his willingness to take risks abroad.
From Congress to the world stage
A Democratic-controlled Congress can block legislation, influence budget allocations, set up investigative committees, and bombard the administration with subpoenas. A Democratic Senate can also hit Trump's personnel policy where it hurts. The period of largely unhindered Republican control of government is over. And this is precisely where Europe's problem lies.
The US system of checks and balances limits a president's room for manoeuvre more in domestic policy than in large parts of foreign policy. If Trump keeps running into walls at home, the political incentive grows for him to shift to the stage where he can still demonstrate dominance. That would also fit his narcissistic leadership style. Trump does not readily accept constraints as a normal part of institutional power sharing. Defeats are personalised, responsibility is pushed onto others, and strength must be displayed.
Foreign policy offers the ideal stage for that: presidents have considerable room to act, international crises generate maximum attention, and real or perceived successes can be attributed to their own will to lead. This does not mean that Trump will automatically start a new war. But Europe must assume that this president will compensate for weakened power at home by exercising his power abroad all the more visibly.
The tariff weapon hits Europe first
This is true above all in economic policy. Trump does not primarily see tariffs as an economic instrument but as a tool of political pressure. Europe has already felt this. After the trade arrangement with the EU, a tariff cap of 15% applies to most European exports to the United States, while substantial special burdens, for example on steel and aluminium, remain in place.
Audi is particularly instructive here. At one point Trump raised the burden on European cars and trucks to 25% and openly linked his policy to the demand that companies should produce in the United States to avoid tariffs. Audi eventually announced investments of around $4 billion for a US plant. Shortly before the midterms, Gernot Döllner even appeared with Trump at a campaign rally in Georgia. This makes Trump's geo-economic strategy clear: it is not free trade that decides where companies locate but politically induced cost pressure.
German and European companies are supposed to shift capital and jobs to the United States. After an election defeat, Trump might be tempted to double down right here, because he can sell toughness in trade policy as proof of his ability to act. As oil prices dip on Hormuz talks, the economic stakes remain high for Europe.
Ukraine and NATO as leverage
The geopolitical dimension is even more serious. Europe should not count on a weakened Trump automatically becoming more willing to compromise. Washington has particular means in relation to Ukraine to impose conditions on European allies without needing a major domestic legislative process every time. The same applies to NATO. Trump has repeatedly questioned US support for the alliance in public. His course on Greenland also shows how far his transactional view of foreign policy goes.
Even at the NATO summit last summer, he once again demanded US control over Greenland—in other words, over territory belonging to NATO ally Denmark. This is not a side issue. It illustrates a fundamental difference in how the alliance is understood. Ideally, Europe sees NATO as a community of values and security. Trump thinks of alliances as deals: who pays what, who gets what, and what advantage the United States gains from it. Such a stance could undermine the EU's 2030 military readiness goals, which are already under threat despite record spending.
Iran: The most dangerous way forward
The risk is even greater with Iran. Trump wanted to contain the war, but more than six months after it began there was still no lasting settlement. Iran also demonstrated how vulnerable the global economy is at the Strait of Hormuz. This creates a dangerous constellation. A president weakened at home might want to stage foreign policy strength more aggressively. It would be speculative to claim that Trump will escalate the conflict for that reason. But the political incentive for him to show toughness does not necessarily diminish just because his party loses the midterms.
And Europe would also be paying the price: through higher energy costs, additional refugee movements, new military commitments, and further weakening of international non-proliferation regimes. As oil prices dip on Hormuz talks, the underlying tensions remain unresolved.
Trump against the EU, not just against Europe
There is also an ideological dimension that is often underestimated in Germany. Trump is not only bothered by what he sees as Europe's insufficient defence spending. His political circle is also highly sceptical of Europe's supranational integration. Europe must therefore assume that Washington will increasingly cultivate bilateral relations with governments and parties that want to push back powers held by Brussels. A divided EU is easier to handle for a transactional US power strategy than a united economic area with 450 million inhabitants.
The risk is therefore not just that Washington will support Europe less. It is that Trump, freed from domestic constraints, will actively seek to reshape transatlantic relations on his own terms—terms that could leave Europe more fragmented, more exposed, and more vulnerable. As the Democrats' largest House majority in decades takes shape, Europe must prepare for a president who, rather than retreating, may double down on the world stage.
